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presumably the equal of the plaintiff in knowledge of the law and bargaining
power. Thus, the court refuses to alleviate the harsh results of a bargain between
parties who have negotiated on equal terms.
Torts-Civil Liability of Suicide's Estate for Shock Occasioned by Dis-
covery of Body-[Iowa].-The plaintiff discovered the gory body of a friend
who had cut his throat in her kitchen. She instituted a suit for damages against
the administrator of the estate of the suicide for the shock which she suffered
as a consequence of the discovery. The trial court granted a directed verdict
for the defendant., Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, held, that the
question as to whether the deceased's action was "wilful" should have been
sent to the jury; and if the conduct were "wilful," a cause of action existed.
Judgement reversed. Blakeley v. SIzortal's Estate.2
There is almost no authority in the common law on the unique question whether
suicide may be treated as tortious conduct. The suit in the present case appears
to be the first of its kind to be recorded in the American reports., Two Scottish
cases have been reported involving actions by rooming-house keepers against
the administrators of the estates of tenants who had committed suicide in their
rooms. In the first of these cases, where the manner of suicide was similar to that
in the instant case, recovery was allowed,4 while in the second, where the suicide
was by hanging, the action failed.s In each case the basis of the action was that
there had been a breach of an implied contract to use the premises only for
dwelling purposes, a tenuous theory which would not support the action in the
principal case.
the unequal knowledge of the parties is expressly recognized and restitution is granted. Bull,
Exec'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Carpenter v. Southworth, i65 Fed. 428 (C.C.A.
2d, i9o8); Rest., Restitution § 46(b) (I937); Mistake of Law: A Suggested Rationale, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 336, 342 n. 19 (3) (i93i). Compare the result of the distinction between latent
and patent mistake in bids, in giving relief more readily against skilled specialists than against
unskilled homeowners. Lubell, Unilateral Palpable and Impalpable Mistake in Construction
Contracts, i6 Minn. L. Rev. 337 (932).
I The basis of the directed verdict was that the injury arose at the time of the discovery of
the body, which was after the deceased's death. Consequently there was no cause of action
in existence at the time of the death of the deceased which might be brought by virtue of the
Iowa survival statute against the administrator. The Iowa survival statute is very broad:
"All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the per-
son entitled or liable to the same." Iowa Code (939) § 10957. The Supreme Court held that
the cause of action was the wrongful conduct, which took place prior to death.
2 20 N.W. 2d 28 (Iowa, 1945).
3 In 1924 an action was initiated by a boardinghouse keeper in St. Louis against the ad-
ministrator of the estate of a boarder who had committed suicide. There is no record of the
case in the official reports. 28 Law Notes 23 (1924).
4 A and Another v. B's Trustees, 13 Scots L.T. 83o (igo6).
s Anderson v. M'Crae, 47 Scot. L. Rev. (Sheriff Court Reports) 287 (931).
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The attitude of the early common law that suicide was a most reprehensible
crime6 still appears in the opinions of many American courts. 7 But since the suc-
cessful suicide is beyond temporal punishment,8 the criminality of the act is
involved only in the determination of collateral questions, such as the conse-
quence of aiding and abetting, or of attempting, suicide. Both acts have been
held to be criminal conduct.9 Where suicide is regarded as criminal, the criminal-
ity ought to make the conduct sufficiently wrongful to constitute the basis of
tort liability."' In State v. Campbell,", however, the Iowa court held that since
6 4 B. Comm. *189. An earlier writer explained the criminality of suicide as follows: "What-
ever the Reasons are, in relation to Civil Society, for which the Murther of another is forbid-
den; the same hold and perhaps with greater force, as to the Murthering of ones self; those Rea-
sons are chiefli the having no Authority, the depriving the Publick of a Subject, the impossibility
of naking any Equivalent Satisfaction. The two first of these are of the same force as to the
Murthering of ones self, the third seems to be of much greater; for he that Murthers another
may make some satisfaction as to publick Justice, by the forfeiture of his own Life, and he
that forfeits his Life publickly upon this Account makes some amends to the State, under
which he lives, by deterring others from committing the same Crime by the Example of his
Punishment; whereas on the contrary, he that Murthers himself, not only evades all satisfactions
to the Publick as to the paying Personal and Sensible Punishment; but in so doing gives en-
couragement to others to commit the same: Wherefore Self-Murther may be a greater Crime
in regard to thePubliak, especiallyif it be a publick Person, than the Murthering of another Man;
and if so is undoubtedly forbidden by that Law of Nature, Thou shalt not kill: otherwise that
'Law would be very imperfect, and reach only to the lesser Crime, and permit the greater."
Adams, An Essay Concerning Self-Murther, Wherein is endeavour'd to prove, that it is Un-
lawful according to Natural Principles 26-27 (London: 17o0).
See Hughes v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 312 Mass. 178, 179, 43 N.E. 2d 657,
658 (1942); Southern Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala. App. 207, 220, 194 So. 421,
423 (194o); State v. La Fayette, 15 NJ. Misc. iis, 188 Atl. 918, gig (1937); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 642, 82 S.W. 265, 266 (i9o4); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422
(1877).
8 At one time suicides were "punished" by an ignominious burial in the highway with a
stake driven through the body, and a forfeiture of all the suicide's goods and chattels to the
king. 4 B1. Comm. *i9o.
9 Attempted suicide: State v. Carney, ii Vroom (N.J. Law) 478, 55 Atl. 44 (IgO3); see Com-
monwealth v. Smith, 312 Mass. 557, 559, 45 N.E. 2d 742, 743 (194,); aiding and abetting sui-
cide: Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky. 637, 82 S.W. 265 (29o4); Burnett v. People, 204 Ill.
2o8, 68 N.E. 505 (i9o3).
It has been argued that inasmuch as suicide cannot be punished, it is not criminal, and that
consequently aiding and abetting and attempting suicide are not illegal, because the act aided
or the act attempted is not illegal. Sanders v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. io, I2 S.W. 68 (igo8);
Withers, Status of Suicide as a Crime, ig Va. L. Reg. 641 (i924). Under this line of reasoning
France, Germany, and Austria do not treat attempted suicide or aiding and abetting suicide
as criminal. Spain, Hungary, the Low Countries, and Brazil consider aiding and abetting sui-
cide to be criminal conduct. Garraud, 4 Trait6 th6orique et pratique du droit p6nal frangais
§ 1671 (2d ed., Paris: igoo).
" However, a plaintiff, who suffered shock upon discovery of her sister's brutally murdered
body, was denied recovery from the estate of the deceased murderer, on the ground that the
misconduct was not directed toward the plaintiff. Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.
2d 694 (1936).
At common law if self-destruction is committed while the actor is insane, it is not suicide
[Footnotes xo and ii continued on following page]
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only statutory crimes were recognized in that state, attempted suicide was not
criminal. In view of the Campbell decision it must be assumed that the Iowa
court in the present case regarded the suicide as wrongful upon grounds other
than that it was criminal. The disapprobation of suicide which appears in law,
religion, and society in general" should be sufficient cause for placing self-
destruction below the standard of conduct which is required of the average rea-
sonable and prudent man. Hence, it is arguable that a suicide has behaved
negligently, if his manner and place of self-destruction demonstrates that results
such as those encountered in the instant case would forseeably arise.r3
The treatment of suicide as tortious conduct is further complicated by the
fact that almost invariably the damages claimed would be solely of a mental
nature. Though progress has been made since Lord Wensleydale's famous dic-
tum that no redress could be made for mental suffering, 4 many restrictions are
and is no crime. 4 BI. Comm. *18q. Thus where the act of suicide is alleged to be tortious, the
question of sanity is important if the wrongfulness of the act is based upon its criminality. If,
however, the wrongfulness is predicated upon other than the criminal nature of the act, sanity
is not in issue, since an insane person is liable for his torts. McGuire v. Alny, 297 Mass. 323,
8 N.E. 2d 76o (I937); In re Guardianship of Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 26i N.W. 211 (1935); Wil-
liam v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449 (1894); Prosser, Torts 1089"2 (1941).
rX 217 Iowa 848, 251 N.W. 717 (I933).
12 Society's disapproval of self-destruction pre-dates the Christian era. In Thebes suicides
were deprived of burial rights; in Athens the hand that caused the act was severed and buried
separately; and in Miletus the bodies of all virgins who committed suicide were exposed in
the market place. There was no moral or religious stigma attached to suicides by the Jews until
after the commencement of the Christian era. The Stoics approved of suicide, but Blackstone
regarded them as cowards. In Rome the estate of a man who committed suicide to avoid trial
was forfeited. Ecclesiastical dicta against suicide appeared very early and later were endorsed
by the Protestant churches. Today, with the notable exception of Japan, the laws, religions,
and customs of most nations reflect a disapprobation of self-destruction. Dublin and Bunzel,
To Be or Not To Be 239 (1933); Strahan, Suicide and Insanity 195 (1893); Accarias, 2 Prdcis
de droit romain 178, n. 3 (Paris, 1879).
'3 To describe a suicide as "negligent" conduct appears surprising only because the courts
have had little opportunity to consider cases where the act of self-destruction has inflicted in-
jury upon another person. When an act is said to be "negligent" the act is characterized as
being below a standard set by the customs and mores of the society. Where the injurious con-
sequences of the substandard conduct should be foreseeable, the resulting loss is imposed upon
the actor. Since suicide is conduct below the level set by society, there would appear to be no
reason why it should not be described as negligent when, as in the principal case, the actor
should foresee the harmful consequences of his act. A similar problem of characterization arises
when the suicide is described as "wilful." See note 21, infra. The use of either term should be
unobjectionable, provided it is understood that both words are used only as shorthand descrip-
tions of substandard conduct which causes mental or physical damage.
X4 "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (i86i).
The extension of the scope of liability for mental injuries has been contemporaneous with
advancements in the field of psychiatry. Thus, as more credence is given to psychiatric testi-
mony, it is not improbable that mental injuries will be treated on an equal footing with in-
juries of a physical nature. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 2o Mich. L.
Rev. 497 (1922).
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still placed upon this type of action. Recovery is generally allowed where wilful
misconduct is directed specifically toward the plaintiff, as in assault s and prac-
tical-joke 6 cases. Claims are often defeated, however, on the ground of "re-
moteness" or failure to show a "breach of duty," where the wilful misconduct
was not directed toward the plaintiff, 7 or where the conduct was negligent. 8
These limitations are but verbal manifestations of a general reluctance to grant
recoveries because of the fear that claims of mental injuries may be easily simu-
lated and fraudulent recoveries obtained.' 9 In Watson v. Dilts, ' however, the
Iowa court held a person who indulged in wrongful conduct to be liable for the
mental injury suffered as a consequence of the conduct, even though the wrong-
ful act was not directed toward the plaintiff. In view of this decision it appears,
by the use of the term "wilful" to describe the basis of liability in the principal
case, that the court did not require the plaintiff to have shown that the wrong-
ful act was directed at her.2 Were such an allegation necessary, it would be
almost impossible to recover for mental injuries suffered as a result of discover-
ing the body of a suicide.2
Unusual as the instant case may be, the outcome is not surprising in view of
sAllen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700 (1926); Holdorf v. Holdorf, i85 Iowa
838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918).
'6 Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch,
16o Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931).
'7 Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E. 2d 694, (1936); Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill.
11 (1877). Contra: Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 3 S.W. 59 (I8go); Roger v. Williard, x44 Ark.
587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920).
's Waube v. Warrington,-216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (I935); Sanderson v. Northern Pacific
R. Co., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902). Contra: Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, x65
Ati. 182 (1933); Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, [1925] i K.B. i4I; see Hallen, Damages for
Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, ig Va. L. Rev. 253 (1933). Even in those
states where a strict rule applies, damages for mental injuries may be recovered, if the magic
touchstone of impact occurs so that there is at least a modicum of physical injury. Prosser,
Torts 214 (i94I); Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 155 (I933). It has been said that
since there is a physical injury, the damages, in part at least, are genuine. Hohmans v. Boston
Elevated R. Co., i8o Mass. 456, 458, 62 N.E. 737 (1902).
19 See Harper, op. cit. supra, note i8, at i55; Prosser, Torts 56 (194x); Hallen, op. cit. supra,
note 18, at 254.
20 II6 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. io68 (1902).
" The court's decision that the jury must determine whether the act was "wilful" is mis-
leading. The decision could be construed as requiring the jury to decide no more than that death
was by self-destruction. The defendant did not concede that the deceased had killed himself.
Appellee's Brief and Argument p. 14. The word "wilful" might also imply that the jury must
find that the deceased was sane when he killed himself. However, the court probably intended
to indicate that the jury had to decide whether suicide under the circumstances in the present
case was the kind of conduct for which liability should be imposed, if it resulted in injury to
another person. Because of the varied connotations of the word when used in connection with
suicide, "wilful" seems less satisfactory than "negligent" as a method of describing tortious
self-destruction. Note x3, supra.
"It would be difficult to prove that a person committed suicide in order to cause mental
suffering to the individual who discovered the body.
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the horror of the act. Odd as it may seem that liability could depend upon the
manner of the suicide, such a result is not improbable.2 3 The law cannot give
protection against the harshness of everyday life2 4 and unpleasant as it may be,
the discovery of bodies is not an infrequent occurrence. The degree of shock
produced would ordinarily approximate the horror of the sight. Though suicide
by poison may expose the discoverer merely to an unpleasant and gruesome ex-
perience, the turning of a woman's kitchen into a slaughterhouse can forseeably
expose her to a severe nervous shock. Thus, it can be argued that the particular
conduct in the principal case (whether it be described as "negligent" or "wilful")
is of such a character that liability should be imposed for the damages for shock
which are the normal consequence of the discovery of the body.
23 The only factual difference between the two Scottish cases (notes 4 and 5, supra) was the
manner of self-destruction. Recovery was allowed where the suicide cut her throat. Where the
suicide was by hanging the court denied recovery and stated, in reference to the earlier case,
"from the report in that case it would appear that the material damages arose directly from the
nature of the suicide which turned the bathroom into a 'slaughter-house."' Anderson v.
M'Crae, 47 Scot. L. Rev. (Sheriff Court Reports) 287, 292 (X93I).
24 Thus propositions of illicit intercourse in themselves are not actionable, regardless of how
indignant and shocked the plaintiff may be, Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903);
and the shock of a telephone operator due to a customer's swearing at her is not actionable,
Brooker v. Silverthorne, iii S.C. 553, 99 S.E. 350 (i9i8); but the mishandling of dead bodies
goes beyond harshness and is actionable, Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, X02 N.W. 40 (19O3);
see Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033 (1936).
